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A PREGNANT MOTHER'S
RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT
BENEFICIAL TO HER FETUS: REFUSING
BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS
James A. Filkins, M.D., Ph.D."
INTRODUCTION
In the ordinary course of events, a woman, who chooses to carry her
pregnancy to term, will strive to ensure the delivery of a healthy child.
Occasionally, a pregnant woman may reject medical procedures
recommended by her physician because of her religious beliefs, or her
fears about the effects such procedures may have on her own well-being.
Increasingly sophisticated medical technology has advanced the age of
fetal viability, while extending the ability of physicians to diagnose and
treat fetal diseases in utero.' These medical developments have in turn
fostered the legal concept that a fetus has the right to begin life with a
sound mind and body.2 Applying this reasoning, some courts have held
the fetus' right to begin life with a sound mind and body outweighs the
pregnant woman's right to bodily integrity and religious freedom.3
Medical advances permit the physician to treat the fetus directly, but the
unique relationship between a pregnant woman and her unborn child
inevitably means any procedure directed at the fetus will also be
"Deputy Medical Examiner, Office ofthe Medical Examiner, County ofCook, Chtca-0, IL.
B.A., McNeese State University, 1976; M.A., University of Illinois, 1977. Ph-D,. University of
Illinois, 19S3; M.D., Southern Illinois University, 1990; J.D. (Cand,) DePaul Un, er.ity Collcee
of Law, 1999.
'Board ofTrustees Report, Legal InrterventionsDuringPregnancy Court.OrJcrcJMcJtcal
Treatments and Legal Penalties for Potentially HarndfuI Bcharzor by Prcgnant Womcn, 264
JAMA 2663, 2663 (1990).
2Robin M. Trindel, Fetal hterests vs. Maternal Rights: Is the State Gong Too Far', 24
AKRON L. REv. 743, 743 (1991).3Id.
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performed on the mother.4 A competent, pregnant woman's refusal of a
medical procedure necessary to the survival of her unborn child presents
the issue of whether the State may intervene to override her decision, and
if so, under what circumstances does the state's interest outweigh that of
the woman's.
A competent adult has the right to refuse medical treatment, even
life-saving medical treatment.5 This right is grounded in the common law
doctrine of informed consent, 6 and a constitutional right to bodily integrity
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.7 Additionally, a competent adult has the right to
refuse medical treatment on the basis of religious beliefs under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.8 The right to refuse
medical treatment has never been absolute. 9 Traditionally, courts have
performed a balancing test to decide whether to override a competent
adult's refusal of medical treatment.'0 Courts typically balance four State
interests: preservation of life, prevention of suicide, protection of third
parties and the integrity of the medical profession, against the patient's
rights of bodily integrity and religious freedom." The State's burden
increases with the evasiveness or the risk of the procedure.12 For example,
a minimally invasive procedure, such as a blood transfusion, might
support the assertion of the State's interest over the patient's right to
refuse medical treatment.' 3
The situation most frequently arising in which courts have held the
interests of the State outweigh the rights of the patient has been in the
protection ofthird parties, particularly in matters concerning public health.
For example, the courts have overridden religious-based refusals of
4Legal Interventions, supra note 1, at 2663.
'Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990).
6Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (U.S. 1891); Schloendorff v. Society of
N.Y. Hosps., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). The latter decision is notable for Justice (then Judge)
Cardozo's often quoted observation, "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his own body... ."7Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 271 (1990).
'Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
9Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 262, 270 (1990).
"°Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
1id.
"Alicia Ouellette, New Medical Technology: A Chance to Reexamine Court-Ordered
Medical Procedures During Pregnancy, 57 ALB. L. REV. 927, 929-30 (1994).
31n re Baby Doe v. Mother Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 402 (111. App. Ct. 1994).
362 [Vol. 2:361
RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT TO FETUS
vaccinations because of public health concerns. 4 The need to maintain
order and health among prison inmates is another State interest held to
outweigh a patient's right to refuse medical treatment." In such
circumstances, where public health interests are at stake, a balancing test
may be the best means of reconciling society's interests with those of the
individual.
Some courts have held the State has an interest in the well-being of
a patient's children that outweighs the right of the patient to refuse even
invasive medical treatment, such as a Caesarian section, if her children
would be deprived of a parent by the mother's refusal of treatment.16
Other courts have held the well-being of the fetus outweighs the mother's
right to refuse blood transfusions.'7 Applying a balancing test in these
circumstances imposes upon a pregnant woman affirmative duties with
regard to her living or unborn children that courts have declined to uphold
regarding parents who are not pregnant,' 8 while circumscribing the
pregnant woman's rights to bodily integrity, autonomy, and religious
freedom. 9
In re Fetus Brown20 represents a court's use of such a balancing test.
The Appellate Court of Illinois, First Division, determined the state's
interest in the well-being of a viable fetus outweighed the patient's right
to refuse medical treatment for religious reasons.2'
This article discusses Illinois' application of a balancing test to
resolve the issue of whether a competent, pregnant adult may be
compelled, over her religious objections, to receive a blood transfusion
necessary for the survival of her fetus. The first section of this article will
4Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1904).
'SCommissioner of Correction v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452 (Mass. 1979)1 The court prmittcd
the prison to compel an inmate to undergo hemodialysis.
"'Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 SE,2d 457 (Ga. 19I 1, In re A.
C., 533 A.2d 611 (D. C. Cir. 1987), rev'd en bane, 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
'"Application ofPresident and Dir. ofGeorgetoxvn College, 331 F2d 1010(D-C.Cir 1964),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem'l Hosp. v. Anderson, 201
A.2d 537 (N.J. 1964), cerl. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); Crouse-lri ng Mem'l Hosp v P.ddeli,
485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); In re Jamaica Hosp,,49! NY.S.2d 89 IN Y App Di%%
1985); Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77 (N.Y. 1990).
'sJanet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: il7iat s I'Trong t :tt Fctal Itigbt,
10 HARV. WO~mN'S L. J. 9,23-24 (1987).
'
91d. at 18.
20689 N.E.2d 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
2'Id. At 398.
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examine past appellate decisions reviewing cases in which courts have
sought to compel competent, pregnant adults to receive medically
necessary blood transfusions. The second section will examine the Illinois
Appellate Court's holding in In re Fetus Brown.22 Finally, this article
will consider how the court's application of a balancing test in Fetus
Brown may affect future situations in which pregnant women refuse
medical treatment.
BACKGROUND
Only a handful of appellate courts have considered the question of
whether the State may override the decision of a competent patient to
refuse a blood transfusion. The first case occurred in 1963.23 On
September 17, 1963, the President and Directors of Georgetown College,
the corporate body owning Georgetown University Hospital, petitioned
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for an order
to administer blood transfusions to save the life of Ms. Jesse Jones, the
mother of a seven-year-old child.24 Both Ms. Jones and her husband, as
Jehovah's Witnesses, refused blood transfusions on religious grounds.2
The attorneys representing Georgetown College appeared at the chambers
of District Judge Edward Tamm on the afternoon of the seventeenth to
request he sign an order permitting the administration of a blood
transfusion to Ms. Jones.26  As no complaint, petition, or written
application had been filed, and as no proceeding was pending in the
District Court, Judge Tamm denied the oral petition for an order.27 Later
that afternoon, the same attorneys appeared at the Chambers of Judge J.
Skelly Wright of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.2' The attorneys had filed no written petition for a review of Judge
'
2In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397 (111. App. Ct. 1997).
'Application of President and Dir. ofGeorgetown College, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
141d. at 1011.
5Id. See generally Julie A. Koehne, Witnesses on Trial: Judicial Intrusion Upon the
Religious Practices of Jehovah's Witness Parents, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 205 (1993) for a
discussion of the legal problems confronting Jehovah's Witnesses regarding their practice of
refusing blood transfusions.
"Application of President and Dir. Of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d at 1011.
27Id.
2"Application of the President and Dir. of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1010, 1011 (D.C,
Cir. 1964); cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
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Tamm's denial. Impressing upon Judge Wright the urgency of Ms.
Jones's condition, they requested he grant the order Judge Tamm denied2 9
Judge Wright spoke by telephone both with Ms. Jones's physician, who
confirmed the gravity of her situation, and with Mr. Jones, who reiterated
the couple's opposition on religious grounds to a blood transfusion. 9
Then, Judge Wright drove to the hospital where he interviewed Ms. Jones
in her hospital bed.3' By that point, Ms. Jones' condition had so
deteriorated she could only reply "Against my will!" to Judge Wright's
question of whether she would accept a transfusion.32 Judge Wright
signed the order and Ms. Jones' physicians immediately transfused her.33
On October 14, 1963, after Ms. Jones left Georgetown University
Hospital, she filed a petition for a rehearing en bane asking, "whether a
free adult citizen of the United States can be forced against her will to
accept medical treatment to which she objects on both religious and
medical grounds. 34 Ms. Jones argued the broad implications of her
question both for constitutional rights and for the relationships between
physicians, their patients, and hospitals warranted a rehearing by the full
Court.35 The court denied Ms. Jones' petition with dissenting opinions by
Judges Burger and Miller.36
Although often cited as precedent for the principle a patient can be
compelled in certain circumstances to undergo ablood transfusion or other
medical procedure over religious objections, Georgetown College offers
little guidance. The decision consisted simply of a denial of Ms. Jones'
petition for a rehearing. Over the course of a desperate afternoon, a
federal appellate court judge, acting in haste to save the life of a dying
woman, ordered her to receive a blood transfusion against her will.37 The
Court of Appeals never addressed the constitutionality of Judge Wright's
action. If Georgetown College stands for anything, it stands for the
29Id.
30Id.
Mid.
32Id.
33Application of the President & Dir. of Georgetow:n College, 331 F,2d 1010, 1011 (DC
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
'
41d. at 1012.
351d.
3'Id. Both judges argued the case should have been dismissed for want of ajusticiable
controversy, rather than by denial of the petition for a rehearing en bane.
37Id.
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obvious: in medical emergencies, people act quickly to save lives, not to
elaborate constitutional guidelines. The lesson to be learned is that courts
should settle the applicable constitutional guidelines before the next
emergency, which the Georgetown College court failed to do.
Several months after Georgetown College, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey decided a case, Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Memorial Hospital, in
which a pregnant woman refused a blood transfusion on religious
grounds. 8 Willimina Anderson entered Fitkin Memorial Hospital in the
thirty-second week of her pregnancy.39 Her physicians told her she would
likely hemorrhage during her pregnancy and would therefore require
blood transfusions.40 Ms. Anderson stated her religious beliefs as a
Jehovah's Witness prohibited her from receiving blood transfusions.4'
Fitkin Memorial Hospital then petitioned the Chancery Division of the
Superior Court of New Jersey for authority to give blood transfusions to
Ms. Anderson, should a transfusion become necessary to save her life or
that of her unborn child.42 The court held the judiciary could not
intervene, but the Supreme Court of New Jersey directed an immediate
appeal of the hospital's petition because of the potential emergency.43
Meanwhile, Ms. Anderson fled the hospital.44
The parties, nevertheless, requested the court to decide the issue
because of the likelihood similar situations would recur.45 The Supreme
Court of New Jersey held the law's protection extended to an unborn child
and, therefore, a court could validly order a hospital to administer a blood
transfusion to a pregnant woman to save her life or the life of her unborn
child.46 In rendering its opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court relied on
two lines of case law in New Jersey. In the first line of cases, the New
Jersey courts had ordered blood transfusions for infants over the religious
objections of parents because of the State's interests in protecting
3sRaleigb-Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem'! Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J. 1964), ccrl,
denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
391d.
401d.
41id.
42
Id
43Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem'l Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537, 538 (N.J. 1964),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
441d.
451d.
461d
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children.47  In the second line of cases, the New Jersey courts had
permitted children standing to sue for injuries negligently inflicted upon
them prior to birth a.4 The New Jersey court interpreted those precedents
as conferring some rights on the unborn child.49
The Supreme Court of New Jersey agreed to decide the issue in
Raleigh Fitkin expressly to provide guidance for future situations in which
pregnant women refused medically necessary blood transfusions.' The
court compared a fetus to a living child to justify compelling
intervention.5 The court's opinion offered no other guidance, such as the
factors to consider in balancing the State's interest in protecting a fetus
against the patient's right to refuse medical treatment.
No other cases compelling a blood transfusion for a competent,
pregnant adult were decided at the appellate level until the 19SOs. In
Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority. '2 the hospital
petitioned the Superior Court of Butts County, Georgia for an order
authorizing the hospital to perform a Caesarian section and to administer
any necessary blood transfusions for a woman in the thirty-ninth week of
pregnancy.53 The patient had been examined at Griffin Spalding Hospital
on several occasions in the course of her prenatal care. 4 The woman's
physicians informed her a Caesarian section was the only safe method for
delivering her child because of placenta previa, a malpositioning of the
placenta between the fetus and the birth canal.55 Her physicians believed
an attempt to deliver vaginally would almost certainly lead to the death of
her unborn child and would substantially endanger the mother's life-.. A
Caesarian section begun before the onset of labor would almost certainly
preserve the life of the unborn child and the mother.57 Advised of these
471d.
43Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem'l Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537, 532 JN J. 19G4)
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
491d.
sold.Slid.
"
2Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 SE,2d 457 tGa. 1921 i1
-
3Id. at 459.
54Id. at 458.
SSId.
561d.
s7Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457,458 (Ga. 1951)t
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risks, the mother, nonetheless, refused the Caesarian section on religious
grounds.5
8
The court concluded the unborn child was viable and, therefore,
entitled to protection under the Juvenile Court Code of Georgia. 9 The
court further held the unborn child lacked proper parental care and
subsistence necessary for survival.60 Accordingly, the court awarded
temporary custody of the unborn child to the Georgia Department of
Human Resources and the Butts County Department of Family and
Children Services. 6' The court granted the temporary guardians authority
to order a Caesarian section and any necessary blood transfusions. 6' The
parents moved to stay the order, but the Supreme Court of Georgia denied
the stay.63 The court held the State had a compelling interest in preserving
the life of a viable fetus, particularly in circumstances when the risk of the
compelled procedure, the Caesarian section, was significantly less than the
alternative, a vaginal delivery complicated by placenta previa.6
In 1985, two New York courts ordered pregnant adults to receive
blood transfusions. In Crouse-Irving Memorial Hospital v. Paddock, r the
petitioner required a Caesarian section delivery because of various
complications with her pregnancy. 66 Ms. Paddock consented to the
Caesarian section and all other medical procedures, except blood
transfusions, necessary to ensure a safe delivery.67 Her attending
physician, Dr. Robert Neulander, testified Ms. Paddock would probably
lose a life-threatening amount of blood because of the Caesarian section
and the need to incise her placenta, a site of extensive blood flow.".
Aware of these risks, Ms. Paddock and her husband affirmed their
opposition to any blood transfusions on the basis of their religious
beliefs.69 The court ordered the hospital to administer blood transfusions
581d.
'
91d. at 459.601d.
61id
62Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 459 (Ga. 1981).631d.
(Id.61Crouse-Irving Mem'l Hosp. v. Paddock, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
6 Id. at 445.67Id.
681d.
69IM
"
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to Ms. Paddock as medically necessary.70 The court held the interests of
the State, asparenspatriae, in protecting the health or welfare of a minor
child overrode the right of the parent to refuse on First Amendment
grounds necessary medical treatment for herself."' Additionally, the court
held a patient could not place her physicians or a hospital in the untenable
position of allowing them to undertake aggressive medical treatment on
her behalf, while simultaneously denying them the authority to correct
life-threatening problems arising from that treatment.' The court relied
on Georgetown College for its ruling,73 thereby undermining its holding
given the weak precedential value of that case.
In In the Matter of Jamaica Hospital,74 an emergency similar to
that in Georgetown College arose requiring ajudge to visit a patient in her
hospital bed.7 The patient was eighteen weeks pregnant and bleeding
from esophageal varices, a life-threatening condition in which the veins
in the esophagus are prone to rupture.7 6 The patient's physicians warned
the judge the patient and her unborn child would likely die without a
transfusion."
The judge ordered the transfusion, holding the State had a "highly
significant interest '" in protecting the life of a mid-term fetus, an interest
which outweighed the mother's right to refuse a blood transfusion on
religious grounds.79 Thejudge also suggested the patient's responsibility
to her ten living minor children might have offered a justification for
ordering the transfusion."0 The judge cited Georgetown College as
precedent."1
7 Crouse-Irving Mem'l Hosp. v. Paddock, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443,445 (N.Y. App. Div. 1955).711d.
72Id.
~
7
'Id
"
7'In re Jamaica Hosp. 491 N.Y.S.2d S98 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).75Id. at S98.
761d
"
rId.78jd.
791n re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898, 898 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
oId.
SlId
"
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The facts of Mercy Hospital v. Jackson,82 also decided in 1985,
differed from those of the preceding cases in that the mother's refusal to
consent to a blood transfusion never endangered her fetus.83 The patient
entered Mercy Hospital in premature labor in the twenty-fifth or
twenty-sixth week of pregnancy. Ms. Jackson's physicians urged a
Caesarian section delivery because of problems with the position of the
fetus and her previous abdominal surgery.84 Ms. Jackson consented to the
Caesarian section, but warned she would refuse any blood transfusions
because of her religious beliefs." Her physicians explained the risks of
blood loss from the Caesarian section and the likelihood of her death, but
Ms. Jackson persisted in her refusal. 6
Mercy Hospital, believing the risk to Ms. Jackson to be
unacceptable, petitioned the circuit court for Baltimore to appoint a
guardian for Ms. Jackson with authority to order a blood transfusion.8 7
The judge convened a hearing at Ms. Jackson's hospital bed, but both Ms.
Jackson and her husband reaffirmed their opposition to a blood
transfusion.88 The judge denied the petition for guardianship.89 Mercy
Hospital appealed, but the appellate court upheld the dismissal.9" The
court held a competent, pregnant adult had the right to refuse a blood
transfusion for religious reasons, when her decision posed no risk to her
unborn child.9
The First Amendment issue of religious freedom defined the
arguments of the cases from the 1960s and the 1980s. When did the
State's interest in protecting a viable fetus override a patient's right to
refuse medical treatment on the basis of her religious beliefs? As the
cases have shown, the answer is when the fetus achieved viability. The
courts compared the fetus to a child, and asserted an interest for the State,
asparenspatriae, in protecting the fetus. Thus, the Mercy Hospital court
"
2Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson, 489 A.2d 1130 (Md. Ct. App. 1985). See generally David H.
Baumberger, Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson: A Recurring Dilemma for Health Care Providers in the
Treatment ofJehovah's Witnesses, 46 MD. L. REV. 514 (1987) for a discussion of the case.8 Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson, 489 A.2d 1130, 1131 (Md. Ct. App. 1985).
14 d.851d.
86Id.
87Id.
"Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson, 489 A.2d 1130, 1131 (Md. Ct. App. 1985).
891d.
90Id. at 1132.
9'id.
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could affirm Ms. Jackson's right to refuse a blood transfusion, because her
refusal did not endanger her fetus. The courts' choice of language in
comparing a fetus to a child was telling. The decisions in the cases
reviewed preferred the term "unborn child" to "fetus," a term more
consistent with the courts' justification for extending rights to the fetus.
By the 1990s, both the courts' emphasis and language began to change.
"Bodily integrity" and "right to privacy," under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, became the primary protections of the
patient's right to refuse treatment. First Amendment considerations,
although still very important, assumed a secondary role. In the language
of the courts' opinions, "fetus" began to replace "unborn child." This
semantic change emphasized the position of the fetus as a part of the
mother's body, rather than a separate entity.
In Fosmire v. Nicoleau,92 the patient entered Brookhaven
Memorial Hospital in Suffolk County, New York in premature labor?' 3
Her physicians performed a Caesarian section and delivered a healthy
baby boy.94 Following the delivery, Ms. Nicoleau began to bleed from the
uterus, thus making another surgery necessary.95 Over the course of her
second surgery, Ms. Nicoleau lost a substantial amount of blood requiring
replacement by transfusions. Ms. Nicoleau refused any blood
transfusion, although her physicians advised her she would die without
one.9 7  The hospital sought a court order authorizing it to order
transfusions on Ms. Nicoleau's behalf, if medically necessary2 3
The superior court issued an order granting the hospital the
authority to administer blood transfusions on Ms. Nicolea's behalf."
Later that day, Ms. Nicoleau received the first of two transfusions."' The
patient and her husband appealed to the appellate division to vacate the
order. 0 1 Ms. Nicoleau argued her fears about the medical dangers of
blood transfusions, as well as her religious beliefs motivated her refusal
92Fosmire v. Nieoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77 (N.Y. 1990).
9'1d. at 78.
9Id. at 79.
"Ild.
"Ild.
97Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77,79 (N.Y. 1990).
9Id.
"'Id. at 79.
'1"Id.
1011d.
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to consent to a blood transfusion. °2 Compelling her to submit to a blood
transfusion, she argued, violated not only her right to religious freedom,
but also her right to make her own medical decisions. 3
The appellate division vacated the order.'0 4 A majority of the court
held the state had an interest in preserving life, but noted no showing had
been made demonstrating non-blood alternatives would have failed.0 5
The court held the State's interest in preventing the loss of parental
support was not compelling because the father and extended family agreed
to take care of their minor child should Ms. Nicoleau die.' 6
The Fosmire court's threshold inquiry asked whether an
identifiable state interest existed.10 7 If an identifiable state interest did
exist, the next level of inquiry required an examination of whether the
State's interest was sufficiently substantial to outweigh the patient's rights
to bodily integrity and religious freedom.' The court applied a balancing
test adding to the factors to be considered "the extent to which the State
has manifested its commitment to that interest through legislation or
otherwise is a significant consideration."' 1 9 Thus, the Fosmire court
offered the possibility the State could tip the balance between State
interests and patient rights through legislation."0  The court did
acknowledge a distinction between conduct injurious to one's self and
conduct injurious to third parties: the former conduct, the court noted, is
usually protected; the latter conduct is rarely, if ever, protected."'
The hospital argued the State has a compelling interest in
preserving the life of the mother for the benefit of the child."12 Just as the
State, as parens patriae, will not permit a parent to abandon a child,
neither should it permit "this most ultimate of voluntary
abandonments.""13 The appellate court held, although the State will not
permit abandonment of a child, neither will it intervene in every parental
Ic"Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 79 (N.Y. 1990).
103 d104Id.
1051d.
I'Id.
"°'Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 79 (N.Y. 1990).
1031d.
0MId.
1Old.
11'Id.
1"Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 80 (N.Y. 1990).
113Id.
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decision potentially jeopardizing the family structure." 4 The State's
concern for family integrity is not one enforced at the expense of all
personal rights."5 Accordingly, the court upheld the appellate court's
denial." 6 Nevertheless, the court's decision upheld the principle of a
balancing test and introduced the possibility that state legislation could
alter the balance.
In In re: Matter of Patricia Dubreuil,"' the Supreme Court of
Florida overturned a lower court's order compelling a woman to undergo
a blood transfusion to which she objected for religious reasons."8 Ms.
Dubreuil entered Memorial Hospital in an advanced state ofpregnancy." 9
Her physician performed a Caesarian section, delivering a boy z During
the surgery, Ms. Dubreuil lost a considerable amount of blood making a
blood transfusion necessary to save her life.' As a Jehovah's Witness,
Ms. Dubreuil refused any transfusions.'2 Memorial Hospital contacted
her estranged husband, who granted permission for a blood transfusion,
which the hospital then gave.2' When Ms. Dubreuil's physician realized
additional blood transfusions would be necessary, the hospital sought an
emergency declaratory judgment to determine the hospital's authority to
administer blood transfusions to Ms. Dubreuil as medically indicated.,Z'
The trial court granted the hospital's petition permitting Memorial
Hospital to administer transfusions to Ms. Dubreuil as medically
indicated. 2" The court based its ruling on the State's interest in
preventing the abandonment of Ms. Dubreuil's four minor children,
should she die. 26 Mr. and Ms. Dubreuil had separated, with the four
14Id.
116 d.
"71nre Matter ofPatricia Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1993). ScegcncrallyIJennifrL.
Barnonte & Cathy Bierman, In Re Dubreuii: Is an Individual's Right to Rcfuhsc a Blogd
Transfusion Contingent on Parental Status?, 17 NOVAL., REV. 517 (1992) for a disvu 2,on ofthe
case.
"se re Matter ofPatricia Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1993).
"
91d. at 820.
1201d.2 1d.
mId.
'2in re Matter of Patricia Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 829 (Fla. 1993).
'
241d. at 822.
'BId.
126Id.
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children staying with their mother. 127 Mr. Dubreuil had indicated he
would not care for the children in the event of Ms. Dubreuil's death. 
12
Ms. Dubreuil sought discretionary review from the Supreme Court of
Florida, arguing the trial court's decision violated her constitutional rights
to privacy, bodily self-determination, and religious freedom.
29
The court held a patient's rights to religious freedom and bodily
integrity must be upheld absent a compelling state interest carried out by
means narrowly tailored in the least intrusive manner possible to the
person's rights. 3 ° A balancing test must be employed weighing whether
Ms. Dubreuil's refusal of a blood transfusion constituted a risk of
abandonment of her children amounting to a compelling state interest
sufficient to override her rights to religious freedom and bodily
integrity. 3 ' The court held the State failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence Mr. Dubreuil would not assume responsibility for the
children. 132 The court concluded the trial court erred in holding that the
State presented sufficient evidence of abandonment to justify overriding
the patient's constitutional freedoms. 133 The court cautioned that each
case should be decided on an individual basis. 34 In some circumstances,
the court continued, abandonment could constitute a compelling
interest.131
The two appellate decisions from the 1990s examining the right of
a competent, pregnant adult to refuse a blood transfusion necessary to the
survival of her fetus each applied a balancing test in upholding the
patient's right to refuse treatment. Although one can argue the Fosmire
and Dubreuil courts decided the cases correctly, their preservation of the
balancing test left open the possibility State interests, in certain
circumstances, could outweigh the patient's right to bodily integrity and
religious freedom. In particular, the Fosmire court's dictum that the
degree of the State's commitment to a substantial State interest can be
127Id.
'
28In re Matter ofPatricia Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 822 (Fla. 1993).
'
291d. at 820.
1301d
"131Id.
i321d.
"31n re Matter of Patricia Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 820 (Fla. 1993).
134 d. at 822.
135 d.
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inferred through its legislation, and therefore, can, on that basis, be a
"significant consideration" invites legislative intervention.
INRE FETUS BROVN
Facts of the Case
Recently, the Appellate Court of Illinois, First Division, decided a case in
which a competent, pregnant adult refused, on the basis of her religious
beliefs, blood transfusions necessary to the survival of her fetus.' The
State ofIllinois asserted that its interests in the well-being of a viable fetus
outweighed the patient's rights to refuse medical treatment.
37
Darlene Brown, a twenty-six year old Jehovah's Witness, entered
Ingalls Memorial Hospital on June 26, 1996 for the removal of a urethral
cyst.138 At the time of her admission, the woman was between thirty-four
and thirty-seven weeks pregnant. 39 The attending physician, Dr. Robert
Walsh, estimated Brown would lose approximately 100 cubic centimeters
of blood during the surgery.140 However, she eventually lost 700 cubic
centimeters of blood. 41 At that point, Dr. Walsh ordered three units of
blood for transfusion, but Ms. Brown, who was fully conscious, refused
the blood, explaining she was a Jehovah's Witness. 4  Believing Ms.
Brown to be competent to refuse the blood, Dr. Walsh completed the
surgery using other means to control her bleeding. 4 3 By the end of the
surgery, Ms. Brown had lost approximately 1500 cubic centimeters of
blood.144
Post-operatively, Ms. Brown's hemoglobin level, an indirect
indication of the amount of blood in her body, decreased to 4.4 grams per
deciliter, a dangerously low level. 145 When Ms. Brown's hemoglobin
continued to decrease, Dr. Walsh warned her both she and her fetus could
1311n re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397 (Ill. App. CL 1997).
'
37 d. at 398.
1id. at 399.
1391d.
1401d.
4'In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 399 (i11. App. Ct. 1997)
1421d.
143Id
14Id.
145jd
"
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die.'46 After consulting other physicians and attempting other medical
procedures, Dr. Walsh failed to increase Ms. Brown's hemoglobin level. 47
Dr. Walsh estimated without a blood transfusion Ms. Brown's chances of
survival, as well as those of her fetus, were less than five percent.
41
On June 28, 1996, the State of Illinois filed a petition for
adjudication of wardship and a motion for temporary custody of Baby
Doe, a fetus, pursuant to the Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1987.", 9 The
court held a hearing that same day appointing, over objection, the Public
Guardian of Cook County to represent the fetus.5 Uncertain as to
jurisdiction under the Juvenile Court Act, the court declined to continue
under the State's petition for adjudication of wardship.'' The State
responded by invoking the court's equitable powers to file a petition for
hearing on whether a temporary custodian could be appointed to consent
to a medical procedure; namely blood transfusion.'52
At the hearing, the State called Dr. Walsh, and Kurt Johnson, the
Chief Operating Officer of Ingalls Memorial Hospital. 5 3 Dr. Walsh
testified to the need, for Ms. Brown to have the blood transfusion. 5 4 Mr.
Johnson testified he knew of Ms. Brown's medical condition and of Dr.
Walsh's opinion regarding the necessity of the blood transfusion." Mr.
Johnson stated his willingness to accept temporary custody of the fetus for
the purpose of consenting to the blood transfusion.'56 The parties
stipulated Lester Brown, the husband of the patient, would confirm Ms.
Brown's understanding of the risks to herself and her fetus of refusing the
blood transfusions. '17 Further, the parties stipulated Mr. Brown would
testify he would continue to care for his two stepdaughters should Ms.
Brown die.'
1461n re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 399 (I11. App. Ct. 1997).
147Id.
1481d.
1491d.
150Md.
'
5 in re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 399 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
52 d.
153Id.
154 Id.
"-'Id. at 399-400.
15% re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 400 (Il1. App. Ct. 1997).
'
57 d. at 400.
1581d.
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The trial court granted the State's petition by appointing Mr.
Brown as temporary custodian of Fetus Brown with the right to consent
to one or more blood transfusions for Darlene Brown when advised of the
necessity by any attending physician 59 Subsequently, Ms. Brown's
physicians transfused her with six units of packed red blood cells from
June 28, 1996 through June 29, 1996.10 On July 1, 1996, Ms. Brown
delivered a healthy baby. 6
1
Following a status hearing, the trial court vacated the temporary
custody order, dismissed the State's petition, and closed the case.1' 2 Ms.
Brown filed a notice of appeal to challenge the circuit court's order
appointing a temporary custodian with the power to consent, on behalf of
Darlene Brown, to transfusions for her fetus.113 The Public Guardian
appealed the court order vacating temporary custody and dismissing the
State's petition, as well as challenging the order appointing the Public
Guardian to represent the interests of the fetus.' The State of Illinois, as
appellee, challenged the issues raised on appeal by Darlene Brown.' 5
The appellate court noted, although the factual issues had become
moot, the legal issues satisfied the public policy exception to the Illinois
mootness doctrine.1 66  Because the issue required authoritative
determination for the future guidance ofpublic officials, particularly given
the emergency nature of such proceedings, the appellate court agreed to
review the case' 67
The Holding
In re Fetus Brown presented the issue of whether a competent, pregnant
adult's right to refuse medical treatment couldbe overridden by the State's
substantial interest in the welfare of a viable fetus. 3 The mother, Darlene
Brown, argued she had an absolute right as a competent adult to refuse
I 9ld.
160Id
1l'In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 400 (Il. App. Ct. 1997).
1621d.
1631d.
164Id.
'
651n re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 400 (II!. App. Ct. 1997).
165id.167 a1.1611d. at 40 1.
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medical treatment. 6 9 The State of Illinois argued that its substantial
interest in the well-being of a viable fetus outweighed the minimal
invasion imposed by the blood transfusion. 7 ' Ms. Brown argued no
balancing test should apply. 171 The state argued a balancing test should be
used to weigh state interests against patient rights. 7 2
The State grounded its argument in a 1994 case, In re Baby Doe,
in which the State asked the appellate court to apply a balancing test
weighing the rights of a fetus against the right of a woman to refuse a
Caesarian section. 73 Two distinctions existed between Baby Boy Doe and
Fetus Brown. First, Fetus Brown asserted the rights of the State in
protecting a viable fetus, while Baby Boy Doe asserted the rights of the
fetus itself. Second, Baby Boy Doe involved an invasive surgery, a
Caesarian section, while Fetus Brown required only blood transfusions
through an intravenous catheter already in place and to which the patient
had already consented.' 74
The Baby Boy Doe court relied on the opinion of the Illinois
Supreme Court in Stallman v. Youngquist, 75 in which the court held a
fetus cannot have rights superior to its mother. 76  Accordingly, the
Stallman court ruled a pregnant woman owes no legally cognizable duty
to her fetus. 17 7 Following Stallman, the Baby Boy Doe court applied a
balancing test to maternal and fetal rights ruling a woman's refusal of an
invasive procedure such as a Caesarian section, even at peril to her fetus,
should be honored. 178 The Baby Boy Doe court applied the rationale in
Stallman, stating the woman's right to refuse medical treatment derived
from her rights to privacy, bodily integrity, and religious freedom. 17' The
court held the potential impact on her fetus of her refusal of medical
treatment to be irrelevant. 80 The Baby Boy Doe court left open the
1691d.
17°1n re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397,401 (111. App. Ct. 1997).
17lid
172jd
"
"17'n re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
174In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 401-02 (Il1. App. Ct. 1997).
17Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988).
176In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 401 (I11. App. Ct. 1997) (citing Stallman v.
Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 359 (Iil. 1988)).
"7d. (citing Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 359 (I11. 1988)).
17ln re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 333 (Iil. App. Ct. 1994).
79/'d.
180Id.
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question of-whether relatively non-invasive and risk-free procedures, such
as blood transfusions, could be ordered in such circumstances."8 '
As noted, Darlene Brown argued a competent adult has an absolute
right to refuse medical treatment.' Qualifying the patient's choice to
refuse treatment, Ms. Brown undermined the patient's authority to make
a competent, informed decision. 8 3 Illinois only recognizes a common law
right of competent adults to refuse medical treatment.' Although the
United States Supreme Court has suggested the right to refuse medical
treatment has support in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution,' the Illinois Supreme Court has declined
to construe the Illinois Constitution to include a right to refuse medical
treatment. 86 The Illinois Supreme Court has recognized religious-based
objections to medical treatment under the First Amendment,'' but has
never recognized an absolute right to refuse medical treatment.Y6
3
Courts, as noted earlier, tend to consider four state interests in
deciding whether to override a competent patient's refusal of medical
treatment: the preservation of life, the prevention of suicide, the protection
of third parties and the integrity of the medical profession.' The circuit
court agreed with the medical testimony that the preservation of the life
of Ms. Brown and her fetus required blood transfusions.' Considering
the four state interests, the circuit court held prevention of suicide was not
an issue, because Ms. Brown stated her willingness to accept medical
treatment apart from transfusions.19' The court reasoned the ethical
integrity of the medical profession would be upheld, because the
transfusion could be accomplished through a catheter already in place,
requiring minimal bodily invasion.'9 The court acknowledged a strong
state interest in protecting third parties because ofMs. Brown's two minor
1811[d.
rain re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397,402 (111. App. Ct. 1997).
183M.
I'Id.
115Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 561,577 (1990).
1"In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E. 397,401 (I!!. App. Ct. 1997).
187 d.
1881d.
193id.
'91In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E. 397, 403-04 (111 App, Ct. 1997).
192Id.
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children.'93 The court also acknowledged the State's interest in preserving
both the life of Ms. Brown and the well-being of her fetus,194 but noted,
following Baby Boy Doe, that interest only attaches to the life of the
decision-maker.'9 The State's interest in preserving life is lessened when
the decision-maker is the person who competently and knowledgeably
refuses medical care.196 Although the State has an interest in preserving
life, the State also has an interest in protecting personal autonomy.
197
Illinois statutorily recognizes a competent adult's right to refuse medical
treatment. 198 Accordingly, the Fetus Brown court held balancing the
State's interest in preserving Darlene Brown's life against its interest in
protecting her individual autonomy could not be determinative. 9 9 The
court also held, absent evidence Ms. Brown's children would be
abandoned by her death, neither could the issue of third party protection
be determinative.00
The Fetus Brown court held the determinative issue was the State's
interest in protecting the viable fetus.20 1 Following Planned Parenthood
v. Casey,2 °2 the court asserted the State maintains a "substantial interest"
in potential life throughout pregnancy.2 3 In regard to abortion, the State's
interest becomes compelling at viability.2 4 However, both the Illinois
Supreme Court and the Illinois Constitution have remained silent on the
State's interest in a viable fetus. 2 5 The Illinois Abortion Act of 1975
defines an unborn child as a human being from the moment of
206 bc
conception, but because Fetus Brown was not an abortion case, the
court held the State could not assert a compelling interest in protecting a
193Md
"194'Id.
195Id
"
96In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397,403 (Iil. App. Ct. 1997) (citing Norwood Hosp. v.
Munoz, 564 N.E.2d 1017, at 1023 (1991)).
197In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397,403 (I11. App. Ct. 1997).
19'Id
"
199Id.
20'Id.
21Id. at 404.
2"Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
" In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E. 2d 397,404 (I!!. App. Ct. 1997) (citing Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992)).
4In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397,404 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 162 (1973)).
2sIn re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397,404 (I11. App. Ct. 1997).
2O6id.
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viable fetus under this law.20 7 In addition, although viable fetuses may be
considered persons in regard to injuries inflicted upon them by third
parties, this principle does not apply to the mother.203 Finally, under the
Illinois Juvenile Protection Act, the fetus is not a minor."" Thus, the
Fetus Brown court concluded, without a legislative determination to place
fetuses within the Illinois Juvenile Protection Act, balancing the mother's
right to refuse medical treatment against the State's interest in protecting
a viable fetus, reflected in existing statutes, the State may not override a
competent woman's decision to refuse treatment.20 The court also held
a transfusion was an invasive procedure.21' Accordingly, the appellate
court held the circuit court erred in ordering a transfusion for Darlene
Brown and reversed." 2
CONCLUSION
The Fetus Brown court applied the balancing test between the State's
interest in a viable fetus and a competent, pregnant adult's right to refuse
medical treatment. 2 3 In holding a blood transfusion is "an invasive
procedure that interrupts a competent adult's bodily integrity, 214 the court
scaled the balance in favor of a pregnant woman's right to refuse medical
treatment. "[W]e cannot impose a legal obligation upon a pregnant
woman to consent to an invasive medical procedure for the benefit of her
viable fetus." 215 In rendering its decision, the court did not consider
gradations of evasiveness. For the purposes of its discussion ofa patient's
right to refuse medical treatment, the court held a blood transfusion to be
as invasive as a Caesarian section.216 More significantly, the court failed
to consider the distinction between medical procedures simultaneously
benefitting both the pregnant woman and her fetus, such as the blood
2031d.ZOId
"
201d. at 405.
2
'In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E. 2d. 397,405 (II1. App. Ct. 1997).
21 Vd.212id.
213 Id.
2141d.
2
'In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 405 (Iil. App. Ct. 1997).
2 61d. While often safe, blood transfusions are not risk free. Scegcncra1y P L MOLL1SO:
ETAL., BLOOD TRANSFUSION IN CLINICAL MEDICINE, chs. 16 & 17 (S ed. 19S7) for a dicuzston
of the hazards of blood transfusion.
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transfusion at issue in Fetus Brown, as compared to procedures intended
to benefit the fetus, but risking harm to the patient.'1 7
In preserving the balancing test, the decision in Fetus Brown left
the State free to counterpoise its interest in preventing the abandonment
of minor children against the patient's right to refuse medical treatment." 8
The court declined to consider that issue because no evidence indicated
Ms Brown's minor children would be abandoned in the event of her
death.2t 9 Some basis for concern arises about the preserving of the
balancing test by the court's apparent invitation to the Illinois legislature
to place fetuses within the Illinois Juvenile Protection Act. 20 Presumably,
such an action by the legislature would give the state of Illinois a greater
interest in the protection of a viable fetus than it now possesses.
In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority, the
Georgia Supreme Court ruled the Juvenile Court Code of Georgia
protected a viable fetus. 22 ' On that basis, the court granted temporary
custody of a fetus to the Georgia Department of Human Resources and
Butts County Department of Family and Children Services with the
authority to order a Caesarian section.22 The Court of Appeals of New
York, in Fosmire v. Nicoleau, held "the extent to which the State has
manifested its commitment to that interest [intervening in a competent
patient's refusal of medical treatment] through legislation or othenvise is
a significant consideration. 223
Following this precedent, the placing of fetuses within the Illinois
Juvenile Protection Act could make court-ordered interventions during
pregnancy easier to obtain. This would have several consequences.
Readily available court ordered interventions could easily lead to an
expansion of physician and hospital liability.224 If a pregnant adult has
legally enforceable obligations to her fetus, physicians may be required to
obtain court orders to enforce treatment in any situation in which the
"In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 403, 405 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997).
2
"
8Id. at 404.219 d.
"
01d.
'Jefferson v. Griffin County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 459 (Ga. 1981). See also
Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered
Obstetrical Caesarians, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1951, 1962 (1986).
'Jefferson v. Griffin County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457,459 (Ga. 1981).
'Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 81 (N.Y. 1990).
24Board of Trustees Report, supra note 1, at 2666.
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woman's choice conflicts with the physician's judgment of the fetus'
needs.225 In theory, a physician could be civilly,26 or even criminally
liable for failing to seek a court order in situations in which a woman's
refusal of medical treatment led to the death or impairment of her fetus.27
A corollary of this problem is the extent to which a physician
would become responsible for enforcing any court ordered treatment. 3
This could in turn transform the physician-patient relationship into an
adversarial relationship leading to distrust of physicians by their
patients. 229 Distrust of physicians would undermine public policy goals
of improved obstetrical, prenatal, and maternal care.Y' ° Unfortunately,
many of the women upon whom court-ordered obstetrical interventions
have been imposed are poor or members of minorities.2 31 Thus, the
individuals in greatest need of prenatal and obstetrical care would be the
individuals most likely to avoid medical care, because they feared easily
available court-ordered interventions would be imposed. " Court-ordered
interventions would not necessarily end with obstetrical interventions.
Bringing the fetus within the protection of the Illinois Juvenile Protection
Act could lead to court-ordered prenatal screening tests and restrictions on
the diet and activities of the pregnant woman. 2
3
25Id.
2-6Id.
227Id.
=Md.
2'Board of Trustees Report, supra note 1, at 2666.
2"Veronika E.B. Kolder et al, Court-Ordered Obsietrical hter-cntions, 316 NEw E,',G, J MED,
1192, 1196 (May 7, 1987).
23ZM.
3'Id.
2'3Id. at 1995-96.
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